SYMP 3-4 - Does moral relativism affect conservation practice?

Monday, August 8, 2016: 3:10 PM
Grand Floridian Blrm D, Ft Lauderdale Convention Center
Paul Johnson1, Amy Dickman1, Freya van Kesteren2 and David W. Macdonald1, (1)Zoology, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom, (2)Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbour
Background/Question/Methods

We believe that conservation practice is sometimes inhibited by reluctance to address issues arising from the cultural background in which conservation problems occur. This respect may be rooted in a philosophical standpoint which asserts that culturally diverse values cannot be objectively judged against one another, and that they are therefore equally valid. We consider the influence of this school of thought, known as ‘moral relativism’, on the philosophical basis for biodiversity conservation as it is currently understood.

Results/Conclusions

We provide examples of wildlife consumption, land management and tolerance of releasing invasive species where we suspect that such relativism has been influential. For example, where the same species (hornbills, Bucerosspp) are threatened by both consumption for meat, and by use of their feathers in ceremonial costumes in the same location, we observe that conservationists make distinctly different recommendations for mitigating the problem. It is recommended that the former should be ‘stopped’, while the latter only ‘reduced to levels that are sustainable’.  Our central argument is that any action that has a negative impact does not acquire more validity in being rooted in tradition or culture, as compared with any other motivation.

While we cannot conclusively demonstrate that conservationists are influenced by relativism, our case histories provide compelling evidence for an effect. Conservationists may be inhibited by   sensitivity to accusations of heavy handed intervention, and the appearance of cultural imperialism. But the objective of conservationists is not the imposition of western values, but the achievement of conservation goals. We also provide examples of cultural transformation brought about by  understanding cultural drivers of   wildlife use, and using that knowledge for effective persuasion, rather than coercion. We argue that, while pragmatic constraints associated with human cultures may limit appropriate actions for achieving conservation goals, there are compelling arguments for advocacy of universal principles based upon science to  protect biodiversity for both existing and future generations of people.